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Although the United States is commonly perceived to be the most 
advanced country in the world it is characterized by uneven develop¬ 
ment, with a number of areas resenbling those countries classified as 
undeveloped. This thesis analyzes one such area, New Orleans to as¬ 
certain the extent to which its growth and development are consistent 
with the theoretical assumptions of the literature on undeveloped areas 
and to assess the development strategy of the administration of Mayor 
Ernest Horial. 
Tliis analysis revealed that the theoretical literature does in 
fact provide useful insights for understanding pockets of underdevelop¬ 
ment in the modem industrial state. The initiatives taken by the Morial 
administration have set in motion a process which premises to transform 
botli the material and cultural conditions which sustains underdevelopment. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The United States is commonly perceived to he the 
most advanced outpost of the developed world and its 
major cities are correspondingly perceived to he 
citadels of modernization. This perception, however, 
masks a much more variegated reality. Within the 
modern industrial states there are pockets of less 
developed areas. This thesis is a case study of New 
Orleans, Louisiana, a city which has all of the 
trappings of modernity hut which, at the same time, 
appears to have some of the characteristics of under¬ 
developed areas. 
This thesis has a tv/o-fold purpose. The first 
is to outline a comparative analytical framework of 
an underdeveloped society using a classical theoretical 
approach to modernity model. In this thesis there are 
four basic research approaches which dileneate this 
particular framework: 1) Almond and Coleman's 
analysis of the connection between politics and 
economics within a society to determine the existing 
degree of urbanization in that society; 2) Hollis’ sole 
isolation and analysis of the economic factors alone, 
with emphasis on the actual dollars spent by government 
on increasing "human capital"; 3) Hagan’s analysis of 
the social and political structures as the major 
determinant of the level of development in the society, 
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and Zf) Sadie’s analysis of non-economic forces as 
dominant in affecting economic development progress. 
With this comparative tool I will measure the 
New Orleans model, which consists of a factor analysis 
of the major indices gleaned from the four-category 
model used in the thesis. 
The second purpose of the research is to show 
how the city government, specifically the Morial 
Administration is responding to the particular 
economic problems of New Orleans. To facilitate 
this purpose, the author analyzes and discusses the 
political economy of New Orleans' using the character¬ 
istics extracted from the comparative politics 
literature. 
This exercise will allow us to comment on the 
appropriateness of the model of underdevelopment for 
understanding pockets of underdevelopment in this 
modern American state. It will also allow us to 
formulate conclusions about the increased role 
political participation and effective political 
leadership can play in the ’’politics" of economic 
development. 
An analysis of underdevelopment in New Orleans 
requires an assessment of four patterns: dominant 
themes in the socio-political cultural atmosphere 
of New Orleans, the interests which supported Morial’s 
first election and the impact of the ward system on 
city politics, work force characteristics, including 
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income distribution, and educational attainment. 
Dominant Themes in the Socio-Political Atmosphere of 
New Orleans 
An essential precondition for-development is 
flexible society. The presence of a structure and 
economy open to the possibility of change especially 
of technical economic innovation and incessant 
creativity is deemed to be paramount in literature 
of developing areas. A rigid social structure, 
characterized by an inflexible system of social 
organization, prevents development as long as it is 
effectively maintained and enforced. 
Social organization in New Orleans appears to 
lack such flexibility. One of the dominant themes 
within the socio-political cultural framework in 
New Orleans is its maintenance cf the city's "carnival 
hierachy". Richard Freeman, a man totally enmeshed 
in this structure remarked in a recent article that 
"the inbred social structure in New Orleans will have 
to be modified before the city can realize its business 
and financial potential." This is perhaps the first 
time a member of the city's carnival echelon has 
gone on record as saying that the city's obsession 
with Mardi Gras is anything but favorable to the city's 
well-being. 
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The carnival and private club systems tend to 
exclude a lot of newcomers who never become a part of 
the New Orleans social fabric and never really feel 
that they belong here* Consequently, they do not 
work as hard as they could for the general betterment 
of the city. 
There is a recent trend of migration to New 
Orleans. This may be a hopeful sign of possible 
attitudinal changes. As more people move into the 
area from other industrialized cities in the U. S., 
an influx of new ideas is generated. A large 
percentage of this migratory pattern will be unwilling 
to adhere to the traditional malaise. Dilution should 
occur, weakening the malaise, hopefully killing it 
off altogether. This pattern will only be beneficial 
to New Orleans if the movement of persons to the area 
represents a movement of people who are skilled, 
adaptable and possess a modern business and social 
modus operandi. Additionally, the .influx of out¬ 
siders may provide ongoing positive role models for 
people in the area, especially, the disenfranchised, 
who presently display a sense of powerlessness. 
Morial* s Election and Interests Which Supported Him 
Ernest "Dutch" Morial was elected Mayor of New 
Orleans in the second primary, May, 1978. According 
to the Registrar of Voters, the mayor received 
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approximately 85% of the black vote and 27% of the 
white vote in the second primary. Blacks comprised 
40% of the registered voters and 53% of the popula¬ 
tion at large. Morial campaigned on an Economic 
Development platform. 
Mayor Mortal's election may have been facilitated 
by the ward system of representation in New Orleans. 
New Orleans consists of 5 districts and 17 wards. 
Mortal received 90% of the votes in two of the city's 
largest wards - the 9th ward and the 7th ward. Both 
are predominantly black areas. Because of the heavy 
polarization of opinions which is often characteristic 
of ward government, it could impede a candidate as well. 
The significance of the ward system as it affects 
politics in New Orleans is in the nature and scope of 
the black political organizations which represent those 
wards. This can mean, however, that there is no 
monolithic black electoral political scheme in the city. 
As such, a split in choice(s) for endorsement among 
the groups could leave blacks politically paralyzed in 
a city where blacks represent more than half the city's 
population. On the other hand a unanimity of choice 
could put blacks in political control. 
There are three major black political organiza¬ 
tions in New Orleans: BOLD, SOUL and COUP. 
SOUL is a 9th ward organization. It is basically 
grassroots. This organization is the largest one, and 
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it endorsed Mortal in both primaries in 1978. It is 
deemed to be most powerful by virtue of the large 
numbers of voters in the ward-more than 63>000 
blacks comprise SOUL. The 9th ward is the home of 
Desire Housing Project which is the city's largest 
federally subsidized housing facility. SOUL has an 
all-black membership. 
BOLD, an uptown, primarily 12th and 13th ward 
organization is the smallest, most heterogeneous of 
the three. Its membership and leadership interests 
are from a wider spectrum of involvement than either 
SOUL or COUP. The.members are from electoral politics, 
business - black and white, civic and social sectors 
of New Orleans. The uptown area generally consists 
of the economically affluent and politically 
influential sector of the city. However, BOLD's 
possible influence covers only approximately 18,000 
voters. Blacks comprise half of this total. Bold 
endorsed Morial in both primaries in 1978. 
COUP is the youngest of the three. It is a 7th 
ward organisation but it vies with SOUL and BOLD in 
the "influence" categories. This organization boasts 
the highest number of successful elections of their 
endorsees than SOUL or BOLD. 
Even though the ward has only approximately 
30,000 voters, COUP has used its success record of 
getting endorsees elected to enhance its political 
stature. 
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An endorsement from this organization backed by 
its members who are incumbent elected officials.in 
more cases than either of the others, could mean a 
political advantage for the endorsee. COUP supported 
Morial in the second primary in 1978. 
Theoretically, these organizations can influence, 
if not deliver, the votes within their wards. Assuming 
this is the case,’their endorsement(s) would be very 
crucial to any city-wide, non-partisan election. 
The 1978 election of Morial was a political 
clinic in ward-based politics, whereby the ward 
system operated completely to his political advantage. 
If, however, the largest ward(s) are not politically 
predisposed to a particular candidate, that candidate 
would have a difficult time in a city-wide campaign. 
Source: Registrar of Voters 
Monthly Reports 1977, 1978 
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A survey of the literature of underdeveloped areas 
reveals that the above mentioned factors are significant 
indicators of the level of development within a society. 
Analysis of the labor force participation is impor¬ 
tant because unemployment, employment and sub-employment 
patterns are the most significant aspects of economic 
progress. A low labor force participation rate can be 
correlated with high unemployment figures, high 
illiteracy rates and low income patterns as well as 
an undeveloped society is generally characterized by 
the existence of a large available pool of labor, low 
industrial development and a lack of adequate skills 
training programs to increase employment opportunities. 
The models of underdevelopment cited in this 
thesis suggest subemployment, unemployment and low 
level labor force participation as the main problems 
to be overcome in developing societies. 
The New Orleans Standard Metropolitan Area 
consists of 1.1 million people. Males over 16 comprise 
53% of the population. 10.if of this class of persons 
are unemployed. Females over 16 comprise 40% of the 
population and 14*9 of this class of citizens are 
likewise unemployed. The total unemployment is 10.4% 
(Table II). Students and handicapped persons are 
excluded from these statistics. 
Table II breaks down the labor force participa¬ 
tion by age, sex and race for the city of New Orleans 
in 1977 - one year before the first administration of 
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Ernest Mo rial. 
Table II presents the wide disparity between 
blacks and whites in the labor force and the respec¬ 
tive unemployment patterns. 
Blacks comprised 69% of the total unemployment 
in New Orleans in 1977 in terms of the labor force 
participation and also blacks represented 31.5 of the 
total unemployment of the SMSA as compared to whites 
who comprised 63% of the labor force participation 
and only 5% of the total unemploymeht for the same 
period. 
The overall labor force participation rate is 
64%* Therefore 36% of the population are not reflected 
in the labor force at all. This is the single most 
significant obstacle to development in New Orleans. 
The New Orleans’ Model is analyzed in detail in 
Chapter II. 
There are many reasons which can expalain the 
high level of non-participation in the labor force. 
Among the many reasons in New Orleans would be lack 
of an emphasis on skills training, absence of skilled 
and semi-skilled industrisl and non-industriai 
employment opportunities and a high concentration of 
labor force in unskilled, clerical and hospitality- 
related employment areas. 
Occupationally, a large percentage of the work 
force is concentrated in the three lowest paid 
employment areas: domestics, which consist of 
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approximately 13% of the work force in Orleans Parish; 
laborers which consist of approximately 7% of the 
work force; and service workers comprise approximately 
5% of the work force in Orleans Parish. (Table I) 
Based on these statistics, it follows that the 
majority of the population are in low-income categor¬ 
ies. Therefore, as grim as the unemployment 
statistics are, unemployment in and of itself is not 
the most staggering problem in New Orleans. 
Subemployment is. The high concentration of workers 
in the three areas cited above covers a pattern of 
underdevelopment which may be harder to overcome 
than the unemployment problem is to overcome. 
Subemployment is deceptively detrimental because 
it jeopardizes a society’s ability to capitalize 
on its chief resource; human kind, and it also 
points up the necessity for industrial development. 
Human resources in a developing society are its 
greatest asset. 
Contributing to and combining with the 
unemployment, subemployment and work force 
characteristics is the educational level of the 
society. 
The United States is probably considered the most 
literate nation in the world today. Illiteracy which is 
11 
inability of persons to read and/or write is not 
expected to be a characteristic which would be 
prevalent to any significant degree in a highly 
industrialized society. However, the New Orleans 
SMSA has that characteristic. Low educational 
attainment is the chicken-egg statistics of a 
developing society. As of 1978, 18% of the illiteracy 
was in New Orleans. Additionally, 40% of the popula¬ 
tion has less than a high school education. 
With 36% of the population out of the labor 
force, 70% of the workforce concentrated in domestic, 
service and laborer workers which are the lowest paid 
areas of employment, that 51% of the household 
would be below the $10,000/year income bracket 
would not be unusal. The average income per year 
for service workers, such as tourist-related workers 
was $5>100 in 1977. This figure may be more decept¬ 
ive because it is difficult to calculate and 
document income in the service areas as three 
fourths of the workers in this area are commission 
workers as opposed to salaried workers. And the 
service area, that is, tourism has been the dominant 
economy of New Orleans as a whole for many decades, 
further compounding the problem and the urgency to 
solve the problem. 
The Morial Administration has accurately 
perceived the urgency of the problem, and its astounding 
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consequences for the standard'of living of the citizens 
of New Orleans and has addressed that problem with a 
strategy for economic development as top priority* 
This thesis describes the efforts of the 
administration to address economic development in 
New Orleans and assesses its potential for supplement¬ 
ing and improving the economic plight of the citizens 
of New Orleans* 
Table I 
1980 Citywide Summer Survey 
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1980 Work Force Characteristics in Orleans Parish 
Total Adults in Work Force 
Professionals 





Clerical and Sales 
Others (including Military) 
Retired 
Does Not include non-labor force 
females which totals 
Source: Data Analysis, Profile 
Change, City Hall 













Table I continued 
Income Distribution 
Households below $10,000 51*8 
Households above $50,000 26.97 
Moderate Income Households 21.85 
Educational Attainment 
Percent of population with college degree 28.7 
Percent of population with high school diploma 42.2 
Percent with less than high school 52.8 
Percent of population illiterate 18.9 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Ü. S. Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, 1978. 
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TABLE II 
Labor Force Participation Rates (LFPR) and Unemployment Rates (UR) 
By Age and Race, City of New Orleans, February-May, 1977 
Males Females 
Black White Black White Black White 
LFPR UR LFPR UR LFPR UR LFPR UR LFPR UR LFPR UR 
Age 
16-21 46.4% -58.3% 37.1% 25.0% 51.3% 44.8% 39.2% 23.3% 41.3% _ 66.1% 34.8% 27.1% 
22-34 _ 80.7% 14.8% 73.4% . 5.05% 91.1% 8.9% 88.9% 4.3% , 71.9% 21.2% 55 .5% 6.5% 
35-44 76.4% 6.1% 74.7% 3.1% 31s j% 4.1% _9Z *1% 2,1% 66.4% 6.3% 55 ,1% 4.8% 
48-54 65.4% 6.1% 66.2% 2.7% 85.6% 4.1% 93.8%  U9%_ 48.3% 9.2% 59 ,1% 4.8% 
55-65 69.5% . 7.8% .54.4% 3.5% 65, .0% 4.8% 77 .6% 2.3% 29.8%  -14.3% 28 .2% 7.1% 









Overall Unemployment Rate (UR) 10,4% 
Overall Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) 64*0% 
Source: Nev; Orleans Economic Development Strategy 




NEW ORLEANS SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE (SUMMARY) 
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 
CITYWIDE CHARACTERISTICS 
CITYWIDE STATISTIC OR 
DATA ELEMENT PERCENTAGE OF CITY 
MmHi 
POPULATION (1976 Polk) 526,863 
Persons $nder 18 (1976 Polk) 34.23% 
2 year change (1974-1976 Polk) (%) -2.45% 
Retired Persons (1976 Polk) 8.02% 
2 Year change (1974-1976 Polk) (%) ' 21.54% 
Racial Comuosition 
White (1970 Census) 54.50% 
Black (1970 Census) 45.00% 
Other (1970 Census) .50% 
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS (1976 Polk) 192,371 
Female Heads of Households with Children 
(1976 P lk) 11.71% 
Incidence of Index Crimes (NOPD 1977) 
40,014 
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Households below $10,000' (1977 Citizen 
Survey) 41.38% 
Low and Moderate Income Families (1970 
Census) 46.97% 
Labor Force Participation (1977 Citizen 
Survey) 65.58% 
Unemployment (1977 Citizen Survey) 9.94% 
Jobless Heads of Households (1976 Polk) 21.84% 
Firms in Area (EBE File) 11,437 
Source: Office of Policy Planning, 1978 
City of New Orleans 
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The “basic problem for the city of New Orleans is 
one of subemployment of staggering proportions. 
Though this problem is not unique to New Orleans, 
almost without exception, it is more extensive and 
intensive and its cumulative consequences over time 
have created a climate in the city in which at least 
one-half of the population must be classified as 
impoverished. The local economy has experienced 
economic stagnation since the mid and late 1950's 
with chronic and severe stagnation since 1966. This 
is not because there has been an absence of economic 
growth but because economic development did not 
provide adequate employment opportunities for an 
expanding labor force. According to the Bureau of 
the Census statistics for 1970, "unemployment 
averaged about U$. At the same time the available 
labor pool has grown faster than employment each 
year since 1966, Between 1960 and 1970 the labor 
pool averaged 65% of the population. Between 1970 
and 1980, the available pool has increased to 80%, 
Table I-above shows the.employment trends for the 
above mentioned period,"1 
1 IT. S,, Department of Labor, Unemployment 
Characteristics and SMSA, Bureau of the Census, 
City of New: Orleans, 1970, 1980, 
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Employment opportunities for all of the people 
have been inadequate since 1966, consequently 
unemployment has increased both absolutely and as a 
percentage of the labor force. 
Another related theme is the sluggish rate of 
economic growth since the 1960*s. It is reciprocally 
related to a relatively low labor force participation 
rate. "The nonworker/worker ratio in New Orleans 
is exceeded by no other major SMSA of the 2if6 SMSA*s 
p 
in the 1980 census". (See Table I) 
A closely linked hypothesis emphasizes the causal 
inter-relationship between labor force participation, 
the quality of the labor force participation rate and 
economic opportunities. "Not only is the labor force 
participation rate lower in the aggregate than the 
Ü.S., all SMSA’s—Atlanta, Dallas or Houston, but 
it is lower for men; lower for white men, lower for 
black men; and lower for womenj lower for white 
women, lower for black women, and it is lower for 
all age groups by race and sex. It is lower for 
every relevant dimension of the labor force.(See 
Table I) 
Thus, the problem of unemployment and low labor 




dilemma of staggering proportions. However, subemploy¬ 
ment, not unemployment, is the most horrendous social 
and economic problem. ’The conventional employment 
figures simply obscure and becloud the real issues. 
When the income level of the full-time employed is 
measured and 14% of the family heads worked 50-52 
weeks per year but were still considered below poverty 
in the Low Income Areas and 33% of the female heads 
in poverty areas did likewise, the proportion of this 
problem is evident.,,Zf 
"The 1970 Census showed that the low income 
areas of New Orleans, alone, comprise 
an area about one-half the total area of 
Orleans Parish with about one-third of the 
metropolitan population. In 1980 this 
area had 82% of all the unemployment in 
the entire metropolitan area. Additionally, 
this area represents the majority minority 
population* Blacks and others comprise 
65%.of the population of the N0SMSA."5 
This single, complex issue elucidates the most 
critical economic and social problem facing the city 
of New Orleans today. The- answer to this problem 
involves economic, social and cultural attitudes and 
practices, some of which are in the process of change. 
From the survey of the literature I chose four 
models of underdevelopment from which I developed my 
^ Mayor* s Office of Policy Planning, Economic 
Development Strategy. City of New Orleans, May, 
197Ô.-. 
^ Ü. S. Department of Labor, Unemployment 
charcteristics. 
19 
indicators with which to compare the New Orleans model. 
The Almond.and Coleman model stress the interrelation¬ 
ship between political development and economic 
development. They argue that development can be 
measured by the extent of urbanization, degree of 
commercialization, literacy rate, and the viability 
and significance of a middle class in governing the 
process of change. The definition of underdevelopment 
in this scheme is "...in consequence of problems of 
technology, a relatively large input into the produc¬ 
tion process yields a relatively small output., 
resulting in low standards of living."^ 
Conversely, a modern system is characterized by 
a comparatively high degree of urbanization, widespread 
literacy, a high per capita income, extensive 
geographical and social mobility and a relatively high 
degree of .commercialization of the economy. This 
model denotes ’political integration’ in the Almond 
and Coleman scheme. 
Fundamentally, Hollis’ model is an economic one. 
The major focus of attention in this model is on the 
persistent imbalance between supplies of human capital 
and labor. Human capital is defined as education, 
health and nutrition. The key questions for Hollis 
6 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Colemen, The 
Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton,'N. J.: 
Press, I960) _pp. 56-81. 
20 
are: What portions of the public and private expendi¬ 
tures contribute to increasing human capital and what 
percent is this of the total government expenditure? 
When answered, an indication of both the severity of 
the problem of underdevelopment and of the amount of 
authoritative attention given it based on actual 
dollars spent is. revealed, 
Hagan focuses upon three general types of socio¬ 
political structures to be analyzed to determine 
development levels: "non-competitive, competitive, 
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and semi-competitive" . Higher degrees of economic 
modernization would be associated with greater 
competitiveness within tae socio-political structure, 
"A semi-competitive structure is one in which among 
a sector of the population there is competitive, 
overt, political activity and participation, 
however important sector has little or no 
Q 
voice,"0 Under this classification, the interest of 
the competitive sector will be fulfilled by those of 
traditional or otherwise authoritative leaders, 
rather than become a democratic expression of the 
desires of all, 
^ Everett Hagan, "A Framework for Analyzing 
Change" in Development of the Emerging Countries: An 
Agenda for Research, (Brookings Institute, 1962, 
8 Ibid 
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Sadie makes a general association between the 
pace of economic progress and non-economic forces, 
identifies the nature and importance of the non¬ 
economic determinants and hypothesizes that this 
importance tends to vary systematically with the 
stage of socio-economic development, of which there 
are three: 
"The lowest stage is the one in which 
economic activity tends to be embedded 
in conventional social organization 
and values of the traditional elites. ... 
The intermediate level, in which, 
although the spread of the market economy 
has proceeded relatively far, economy is 
still seriously impeded by the uneven 
pace of social development and the 
ineffectiveness and non-committal stance 
on the part of government. ... 
The highest level is when socio- 
structural bottlenecks no longer reflect 
as significant barriers to economic 
progress and political measures are 
aimed at promoting development.° 
Accordingly, 
At the lowest level, social forces are 
typically the most important non¬ 
economic influence upon economic 
development activity with political 
change exercising a neglible impact. ... 
At the highest of the three levels, it is 
the political forces that are crucial to 
economic performance, while social 
influences have little systematic effect. 
Economic forces alone are most important, 
but it is only at the highest relative 
level of development that they assume 
their full significance.'0 
° J. L. Sadie, Tradition and Economic Growth. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) p. 95. 
10 Ibid. 
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One may safely conclude that within this context, 
the nature of relevant economic forces tends to vary 
with the stage of development; the more specialized 
economic institutions gain full weight in explaining 
differences in rates of economic growth only at the 
highest level. 
The above assumptions about the conditions 
associated with economic development give rise to the 
following hypothesis around which this thesis will 
resolve. 
1) The strongly inhibiting nature of the traditional 
social structure and of the associated value system 
militates against the ability of changes in econo¬ 
mic institutions to generate further change and 
lead to economic growth in New Orleans. 
2) Cultural heterogeneity and a strong conventional 
elite, in addition to the absence of a serious 
emphasis on industrial expansion, wiser use of the 
port, small rate of improvement in human resource 
development, in a atmosphere of a non-supportive 
and conservative banking and business environment, 
all combine to solve the problems of the citzenry 
to cause ineffective political participation and 
to significantly retard the speedy implementation 
of viable economic growth plans in New Orleans. 
Belatedly, 
3) The degree of economic development progress within 
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New Orleans is proportional to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the administrative and political 
leadership and the low propensity of off-setting 
non-econonomic variables* 
4) Further correlation exists between the degree of 
industrialization, skills training and the general 
modernization outlook and the level of commitment on 
the part of the leadership to implementing a problem¬ 
solving strategy. 
These hypotheses will be explored during data 
extracted from the Economic Development Strategy 
developed by the Mayor's Office of"Policy Planning, and 
the author1s assessments of the Mayor's timetable for 
the completion and implementation of the strategy. 
Pertinent data used in this study was selected from 
the U. S. Census Bureau statistics along with selected 
works on research in underdeveloped areas. 
In summary, I conclude that New Orleans, suffers 
from first, a disproprotionately large percentage of 
impoverished people—about 50% of the population; 
secondly, the relative absence of a middle income class 
which denies it much of the dynamism, entrepreneurship, 
and the general social and economic leadership found in 
many other major metropolitan areas. 
There exists two economies and two societies in 
New Orleans— one conventional and one unconventional. 
The most distinguishing characteristics of the under- 
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world economy are these: 
1) incredibly high (subemployment over 45%) 
2) abject poverty (68% families are poor) 
3) relatively low educational attainments and high 
degree of illiteracy (18% illiterate population) 
4) the degradation of welfare for many 
5) human, social, and physical blight, and 
6) substandard housing.11 
These problems predispose the economy to slow 
growth and stagnation. It is unfortunate that the 
unconventional economy suffers from the lack of 
attention and adequate policy measures due to the 
fact that many of the people comprising this economy 
are outside the economic mainstream—a condition 
increasingly more difficult to rationalize. 
In Chapter II, I described the New Orleans model 
as compared to the aforementioned models of under¬ 
development against which the New Orleans model is 
measured are: 
- 1) existent low level of economic growth and progress 
2) prevalence of strong traditional elitist attitudes 
3) absence of an effective and efficient administrative 
commitment to economic development growth and 
progress 
4) low level modernization of outlook and predominant 
non-competitive socio-political structure 
11 New Orleans Economic Development Strategy, 
nrepared by the Mayor1 s office of Policy Planning, May 
'1979, P. 41. 
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5) dominant pattern of non-industrialization and 
unutilized human capital and natural resources 
6) ineffective political participation, high level 
subemployment and absence of a middle class 
Conversely, a developed area would possess: 
1) a high level of economic growth and progress 
2) an administrative system favorably and strongly 
committed to economic development 
3) a modernized outlook and competitive socio¬ 
political structure 
4) a constructive and purposeful utilization of re¬ 
sources in an industrialized climate and 
5) effective political integration along with the 
presence of a viable entrepreneurial class 
Chapter III is an identification of tire major 
impediments to economic growth in New Orleans with an 
emphasis on the strength of the interrelationship 
between the political system and economic development 
as suggested by the Coleman and Almond model. 
Economic development must be pursued so as to 
ensure the best possible utilization of all existing 
resources for the achievement of the different 
objectives desired. 
The following represent a summary of the goals 
of the Morial administration with regard to Economic 
Development: 
(a) establishment and maintenance of an effective 
business assistance and expansion-relocation 
facility in City Hall 
(b) revitalization of neighborhoods 
(c) implementation of targeted skills training 
programs 
(d) expansion of the port and tourist-related 
activities 
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(e) formulation of an effective Citizens 
Advisory Committee and Minority Task Force 
(f) Industrial park-site redevelopment 
(g) establishment and maintenance of an 
Economic Development office, professionally 
staffed.1 ^ 
Chapter IV is an assessment of the Economic 
Development Stragety currently being implemented by 
the City, of New Orleans. By evaluating the efforts 
and current phases of implementation of the above 
goals of the administration, I am able to determine 
the stage of development in New Orleans and to comment 
on the progress made by the Morial administration in 
this area. 
12 New Orleans Economic Development Strategy, 
preuared by the Mayor's Office of Policy Planning, 
May 1979 P. 41. 
Chapter II 
The New Orleans Model 
The picture was a black one, economically speaking, 
May 1978, when Ernest "Dutch” Morial took office as 
Mayor of the City of New Orleans. He inherited an 
economic morass where the trend in economic conditions 
had been slow, downturning and rapidly so. 
Table III is a summary of the socio-economic 
profile of the city in 1978. Briefly speaking this 
summary shows "the population at 5^6,000; the racial 
composition as predominantly white (54%); female heads 
of households; 41% of the households were below $10,000 
income; low income families comprised 47% of the popula¬ 
tion; the labor force participation rate was 65% and. 21% 
of the heads of households were jobless." 
However, the single most outstanding statistics 
from the Table are the economic characteristics. 
Combined with these statistics is the fact that New 
Orleans had no official policy making body to develop 
and implement solutions to th-ese economic problems. In 
light of the severity of the problems which had to be 
overcome, and the fact that the-city did not have a 
functionally adequate economic development program 
13 New Orleans Economic Development Strategy, 
prepared by the Mayor's Office of Policy Planning, May 
1979, P. 41. 
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implementation capacity, it was critical that a commit¬ 
ment of Community Development Planning and federal 
revenue-sharing funds be secured and a professional 
staff organized to attack the problems at the earliest 
possible date. This was one of the first official acts 
enacted by the Mayor and Council upon Mayor Morial's 
taking office. 
That an economic development office had not 
previously been established prior to Morial is due in 
probable part to the city’s traditionally very conser¬ 
vative attitudes toward private enterprise, government 
spending, and taxation. These and other impediments to 
economic progress and development are discussed in 
detail in Chapter III, 
The basic premise underlying the New Orleans 
economic "strategy is that the expansion of the private 
sector employment opportunities for ’central’ city 
residents, particularly, for residents of the city's 
low and moderate income neighborhoods, is a necessary 
•though perhaps not sufficient prerequisite for reducing 
both the incidence of the effects of poverty, unemploy¬ 
ment and subemployment. The lack of private sector 
investment interest in the central cities of the United 
States, since the 1970's, is primarily a function of 
several or more real or perceived negative private 
sector impressions of the business climate of the cities, 
29 
and not a result of basic and irreversible economic 
forces. 
"Since Orleans Parish does (or could) meet or 
exceed national standards relative to almost all 
basic locational factors, it appears to be particu¬ 
larly appropriate to address the question of 
central city business climate"at the onset of 
this chapter. 
In a major survey of 2611 firms conducted in ten 
cities by the Joint Economic Committee of. the Congress 
in 1978, a set of decidedly non-traditional business 
attitudes were uncovered... In the subcommittee’s 
view, "the perceived business climate of a city closely 
parallels the perceived quality of life in that city."1^ 
Six of the seven variables viewed as most important 
by the respondents are overall city attitudes and not 
necessarily business-related factors. They are: "city 
government attitude toward business, crime level, 
adequacy of public facilities, market demand for prod¬ 
ucts or services, quality of city's schools, and 
cultural attractions."1^ 
1if An Industrial Development Research Report on 
"Industry Introspection ’72", January 1974. 
15 City Data Analysis, Subcommittee on Fiscal and 
Intergovernmental Policy, "Central City Business Plans 
and Problems",_January, 1978. 
16 Ibid 
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The subcommittee's report suggests that tax rates, 
business costs and labor factors, in general are not 
viewed as important as the quality of life characteris¬ 
tics, The subcommittee concluded that,.."improving the 
quality of life in the cities where it is poor and 
maintaining it where it is good, can have an important 
impact on decisions of firms to relocate, alter the size 
of their work force, and reduce or expand their 
operations, . ,."17 
Since there does not now exist an objective set 
of criteria from which questions about the city's 
business attitude can be adequately evaluated, a sample 
of recent print media quotations may be helpful in 
throwing some light on this complex topic, 
1976 Everybody knows New Orleans is a good 
place to have a good time. But they 
do not generally think,, of it as a good 
place to do business.ia 
Most of the city's major problems have 
never been confronted by the community 
leadership—not in a let's solve them 
and get on with it fashion. The base 
of community leadership willing to 
confront the city's nagging problems stilly 
is not broad enough, but it is broadening. y 
17 Ibid. 
Jerome S. Verges, Sr., "Selling New Orleans,*1 
South Magazine," November/December, 1976. 
Thomas M. Purdy, Sr. "Selling New Orleans," 
South- MagazineT" November/December, 1976. 
31 
1973 The style of...non-natives does not 
seem to mesh with that of the deans 
of carnival society...so they aren't 
accepted into the inner circle. This 
sort of exclusion is practiced on a 
smaller scale everyday in New Orleans, 
and it is cited by members of the 
city's Economic Development Council 
as a major deterrent to bringing new 
business into the city. Very little 
changes in New Orleans. The city's 
charm endures. New Orleans remains 
the municipal equivalent of a banana 
republic, a tropical.paradise where 
the .friendly natives unload the 
freighters by day and pull down the 
tourist's beds for the evening. u 
1979 The fragrance of magnolias is not the 
only fresh scent wafting through the 
streets of New Orleans this spring. 
In a city often criticized for being 
bogged down in tradition, there is an 
air of change that has surprised even 
the experts. ... In the most blunt 
terms, observers see in the cancellation 
of Mardi Gras and the 30 million 
revenue package and other events evidence 
that New Orleans finally is facing up 
to its long simmering social and economic 
problems.2' 
Combined v/ith the prevalent socio-economic factors 
mentioned above was the fact that in 1978, port, transpor¬ 
tation and tourism, which combine to form the most 
significant aspects of the economy in New Orleans, also 
had downturning trends. Port operations and transporta¬ 
tion represent the largest single source of jobs in the 
20 Thomas M. Purdy, Jr., "Selling New Orleans," 
South Magazine, November/December, 1976. 
2"* James K» Glossman, New Orleans: "I have Seen 
the Future and it is Houston,'.* The Atlanta. July, 
1978» 
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city. It is estimated that port-related activities 
count for 40% of the jobs in the New Orleans SMSA. 
While the Port continues to be the single most 
important element of the New Orleans economic base, it 
is becoming a less significant new employment generator 
because of "labor-saving technology and the relative 
decline in activity compared to other ports on the 
Gulf Coast."22 
In 1978, for example, "cargo volume of the Port of 
New Orleans fell by 24%, resulting in an estimated 50 
million dollar drop in the cityT s economy, as compared 
to 1977; bulk cargo in 1978, for example, decreased 
by 5«45 million tons from 1977*"2^ 
"Tourism may have the brightest spot in the 
economy in 1978."2if It shows a consistent expansion 
of service sector employment, but this employment 
represents unskilled and semi-skilled labor demands 
and the U.S. Travel Data Center reports that "the 
average annual salary for tourism-related employment 
in New Orleans was only $5,743 in 1978."23 
2? 
John Reinecke and Vincent Manigri, "Perfor¬ 
mance of the Port of Nev; Orleans", University of New 
Orleans Report, 1965-1967# 
23 Ibid, 
2^ New Orleans Economic Development Strategy pre¬ 
pared by the Mayor's Office of Policy Planning, May, 
1979, P.41. 
25 u. S. Travel Data Center Research Bureau, 
"Tourism in the New South", The City That Care Forgot. 
1977# 
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The fourth main economic ingredient centers around 
the Central Business Distric development. "Since 1978, 
over 3«5 million square feet of office space and over 
8,000 hotel rooms have been built in the CBDM.^ 
Additionally, three major oil companies—Shell, Amoco, 
and Exxon have constructed sky scraper office complexes 
since that time. Despite these encouraging Central 
Business District statistics, and with all due credit 
to the major employment increases associated v/ith the 
growth of Central Business District hotel and tourism 
and office buildings, employment gains stemming from 
these developments have served to only prevent New 
Orleans* total employment from declining. To the extent 
that new hotel jobs merely replace rather than compliment 
new industrial jobs, total income to city residents is 
reduced and subemployment is increased. 
The most dominant pattern affecting economic 
development in the city is the absence of a solid indus¬ 
trial base. The reason most often cited by the Economic 
Development Council of the New Orleans Chamber of 
Commerce by industries deciding not to move to New 
Orleans has been 1 the lack of a skilled labor force.’ 
The 1978 survey of large manufacturing firms in Louisiana 
by the Public Affairs Research Council rated job-related 
vocational skills and labor skills as the third and 
26 New Orleans Economic Development Strategy, prepared 
by the Mayor's Office of Policy Planning, May 1979, P. 57. 
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fourth most significant disadvantages. Employee Produc¬ 
tivity was rated tenth. 
Further scrutiny of the New Orleans model reveals 
the fact that New Orleans unmet skills level represents 
"40% of the total unmet skills demand in the state, 
though District 1 of which New Orleans is a part, 
comprises only 29.6% of the state’s population".27 
Coupled with this is the fact that the' city faces 
a severe shortage of improved industrial park sites 
within its corporate limits, despite the fact that many 
acres of adequately zoned vacant land exist. Unless 
and until the city and the various private developers 
can cooperatively eliminate this serious deficiency, 
the city will continue to lose existing firms to 
suburban industrial parks, along with many of the jobs 
previously held by city residents. 
In 1980, Louisiana elected its first Republican 
governor since Reconstruction,_ giving rise to the reality 
of the two-party system in the state for the first time 
since Reconstruction. Although city elections are 
non-partisan, overall patterns of city government 
reflect dominant characteristics of one-party leadership 
2' Skills Training - Louisiana Tech University, 
"Louisiana Occupational Training Information System," 
Phase IV, Net Manpower Need, 1978. 
^ Louisiana Occupational Training Information 
System, "Phase IV, Net Manpower Need, Louisiana 
Technical University, 1978. 
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evidenced by the persistence of one-party issue 
orientation, development and problem-solving. 
Because of this overwhelming trend, the hew Orleans 
model is indicative of non-competitive political 
structure. The net result of such a predisposition 
according to the Almond and Coleman scheme, is 
low levels of political participation and 
underutilized human capital resources. 
The administration1s position on the economic 
condition of the city and its direction for chang¬ 
ing the patterns of the economic condition was 
expressed in an address by the Mayor in January of 
1979: 
This administration has made progress 
toward dispelling the illusion that 
an economic boom is always just around 
the corner; that economic progress and 
prosperity for all will shortly be 
bestowed upon us if we just wait 
patiently for it to come. It is this 
attitude, often fostered by well- 
meaning citizens, that has sentenced 
thousands of people in our city to 
an economic and social hell. ...This 
city will not work unless we work 
and...economic growth can only be 
achieved through painstaking effort, 
innovative ideas and the venturing 
of an occasional risk. ...It is the 
singleminded pursuit of this dream 
(of creating a better quality of life 
for all citizens of New Orleans) that 
drives every action of the Morial 
Administration. Other objectives which 
may be set by paths towards this vision... 
It is search of this goal that we have 
set the highest prioroty...^9 
Ernest N. Morial, 
Area Committee, January 18 
Speech before Metropolitan 
, 1978. 
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In summary, New Orleans in 1978 exemplified a low 
level of economic growth and an actual decline in the 
vital areas of transportation, manufacturing and business 
relocation to the city. Favorably speaking, the city 
possessed a leader in Dutch Morial, strongly committed 
to formulating and implementing an economic development 
strategy. "Vftthin an overall state-wide non-competitive 
soci-political structure, the initial process of 
developing and sustaining a modernized outlook evolves."30 
As a result of the above analysis and the model construc¬ 
ted, the city demonstrates one positive indication of 
economic progress in 1978, that being, an administrative 
system favorably and strongly committed to economic 
development. 
It is significant to note that several factors serve 
to impede the economic progress movement that the Morial 
administration has formulated. These factors operate 
within a distinctive cultural setting which has existed 
from the foundations of the city. The role of the 
administration in 'turning the city' around is rendered 
tougher in light of the strength of the cultural patterns 
of exclusion.. 
The New Orleans model is unique because the dominant 
patterns of leadership in the city has been Catholic and 
white. While the administration grapples with being the 
3® G. I. Blanksten, "Transference of Social and 
Political Loyalties," in Industrialization and Society. 
(New York: Albert A. Knopf, 1963) p. 37# 
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first Black leadership in the city, it also has the 
distinction of being the first governmental leadership 
body which has campaigned and won on economic development 
as its number one priority. 
The New Orleans model further evidences social 
tensions at the onset of economic development progress 
is not surprising. "It is often indicative of a dissatis- 
i 
faction on the part of the populace with the status quo 
and a readiness on their parts to experience a higher 
standard of living and greater political participation."^1 
The voice of social tensions is heard when the economic 
voice of participation has been lowered due to declining 
economic participation and progress. Though there are 
definite correlations between the degree of cocial 
tensions and the level of economic development, this 
study does not analyze this value relationship between 
the notation above. 
^ Irma Adelman, Society. Politics and Economie 
Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 1967) pp. 108-112. 
Chapter III 
Impediments to Economic Development in New Orleans 
The following definitions direct the initial 
formation of my explanation of the causal nexus of 
socio-cultural and political-economic factors prevalent 
in New Orleans which will serve to facilitate a highly- 
competetive structural framework and encompass economic 
development growth and progress. These definitions, are 
the foundation of the conclusions drawn in this thesis. 
These are: 
• Socio-cultural Indicators 
The extent of dualism refers to the 
existence of traditional and the modern 
side by side, a method of value favor¬ 
able to entrepreneurship and industrial 
growth; willingness on the part of the 
population to accept change.32 
"Economic development has almost invariably been 
accompanied by significant transformation in the pattern 
of family kinship relations. The extended family tends 
to diminish incentives for performing risks or gambles 
and thus has an adverse effect upon investment. The 
nuclear, not the extended family, facilitates the link¬ 
ing of personal efforts and rewards for.effort."33 This 
indicates the character of the basic social organization 
Everett Hagan, "A Framework for Analyzing Change 
in Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for 




The rate of improvement in human resource develop¬ 
ment is indicated by "the level, quantity and quality 
of skills training programs, motivational and employer 
based plus the amount of time and money spent in 
effective business relocation packages".^ 
The importance of the indigenous middle class is 
evidenced by the "availability of a pool of commercial, 
entrepreneurial, professional and technical talents , 
which provides the leadership for economic change, 
whether via salaried governmental officials or private 
enterprise."^ 
The extent of social mobility refers to 
the degree to which individual attainments 
are met with social recognition and 
advance; extent to which economic achieve¬ 
ments receive positive social approval; 
the importance to innovation and 
entrepreneurship of social values that 
emphasize individual achievement. The 
extent of social mobility refers to the 
extent of opportunity for an individual 
to advance by means of ability rather 
than social status; amount of vertical 
mobility; extent of opportunity to obtain 
skills and education, as well as the 
measure of educational opportunity. 
Lastly, it refers to the presence or 
• absence of prohibitive cultural or 
ethnic barriers to upward social 
mobility within a framework of oneness 
and access to political leadership.36 
The degree of cultural and ethnic homogenity refers 
3Zf Ibid. 
55 pjverett Hagan, "A Framework for Analysing 
Change", p. 83« 
36 Ibid. 
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to the presence of diversity in language, culture, 
religion and race—primordial attachments, kinships 
and religion. These are strongest at the earliest 
stage of economic development."^' The lack of social 
integration contribute to the difficulties in initia¬ 
ting a process of economic growth. 
"The primordial attachments conflict with 
the requirements for "effective political 
integration and commitment to an imperson¬ 
al area-wide civil order. Not only does 
cultural and ethnic heterogeneity tend to 
hamper the early stages of economic growth, 
but in addition, the initial effects of 
urbanization and industrialization may -be 
to intensify awareness of religious, racial 
cultural differences and thus to produce 
social tensions that in the short run, at 
least create additional impediments to 
socio-economic and political development."-^0 
Historically, unifying cultural and ethnic 
transformations have been extremely slow, taking 
in some instances, centuries- to reach completion."^ 
Transformation of the contents of the minds 
of the elite 7/ho direct, and of the men who man the 
society and policy, is an essential aspect of change."^0 
57 A. F. K. Organski, "The Stages of Political 
Development" in Society. Politics & Economic Develop¬ 
ment: A Quantitative Approach, ed. Irma Adelman, 
(New. York: Harper & Bros) p. 108. 
5® Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization. (Free Press, 1957) PP• 62-9U 
^ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The 
Politics of Developing Areas. (Princeton University 
Press, I960) pp. 56-81-. 
Ibid. 
A modern society is not just a complex 
of modern institutions. It is a mode 
of integration of. the whole society. 
It is a relationship between the center 
and the periphery of the society. 
Modern society entails the inclusion 
of the population into the society in 
the sense that both elite and mass 
regard themselves as members of the 
society, and, as such, as of approximate 
equal dignity. It involves the values 
of the society; a more active role in 
the ranking of society-wide decisions, 
and a greater prominence in the con¬ 
sideration of the elite. 
Political-economic factors 
"The abundance of natural resources refers to the 
presence of surplus resources (those for which 
alternative domestic uses do not currently exist), 
and an analysis of the manner in which their 
exploitation contributes to the expansion of trade 
and income."**2 
The gross investment rate is the "supply of 
capital improvements in technology combined with the 
efficiency in the allocation and use of capital, 
more so than the size of the total investment fund*,,if^ 
^ Gabriel A. Almond and James. S. Coleman, The 
Politics of Developing Areas. (Princeton University 
Press, I960, pp. 56-81. 
42 XT-> * 
Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
The change in degree of industrialization 
refers to specialization in primary rather 
than industrial products. This contributes 
most to growth in areas with abundant natural 
endowments. On the opposite side of the 
coin, the enlargement of opportunities for 
individual advancement and the emergence of 
an environment conducive to change and 
innovation ignites industrialization.44 
The effectiveness and improvement of the fiscal 
arena in New Orleans may be one of the most significant 
indicators of economic progress. Taxation enables 
governments to secure control over resources that can 
be used to finace basic improvement and investment in 
social overhead capital, consequently, this serves to 
make the distribution of income more equitable. An 
effective fiscal arena is successful in increasing 
the proportion of total domestic resources available 
for investment and in opening the banking and business 
community to support the increases accordingly. 
The financial institutions of New Orleans face 
several problems which reduce their ability to support 
vigorous economic growth programs in the city. Primary 
among these problems are "inadequate capital resources, 
restrictive state laws which limit the growth of banks 
and other financial institutions, and an exaggerated 
aversion to risk and long loan terms'1,^ 
44 Everett Hagan, "A Framework for Analyzing 
Change" in Development of the Emerging Countries, An 
Agenda for Reas ear ch, (Brookings Institute, 19 p,108, 
45 Rosen Wigand, "A Census of facts and Perceptions 
Regarding Business in the Riverfront and Industrial 
Areas, Downtown Development District. November, 1978, 
p. 54. 
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In terms of their impact on the city's business 
climate, it is probably fair to say that overall, 
Orleans Parish credit institutions are viewed as 
being somewhat > overly conservative-* . 
Among the south's top 50 backing companies 
(based on total deposits), "New Orleans, banks Rank 
25th _ Whitley Holding Corporation, 50th - First 
Commerce Corporation, and 42nd - Hibernia Corporation."^ 
It is significant to note that the Mayor and 
City Council of New Orleans have limited taxing ability 
relative to other cities of comparable size. "Property 
tax revenues constitute only 16.6% of total, revenues 
generated compared to an average of 25% in cities of 
comparable size."^7 This id due in part to a state¬ 
wide homestead exemption on property tax for homes 
valued less than $50,000. 
Act 420 cf the Louisiana State Legislature "permits 
48 
a bond limitation of $300 million for Orleans Parish". 
The city's current outstanding debt capacity (based on 
49 
gross assessments) is only "$122 million." 
^ Rosen -Wigand, "A Census of facts and Perception 
Regarding Business in the Riverfront and Industrial 






As a result of this the city has to rely on sales 
tax for operating revenues ("16% as compared to an 
average of only 4% in cities of comparable size")^ 
to augment intergovernmental revenue sharing. 
The interrelationship between the political 
characteristics of developing areas and its economic 
growth is receiving considerable attention in recent 
years. Recent investigations of the political sys¬ 
tems of developing nations "suggest that there may 
be systematic patterns of'political change 
associated with economic development. While there 
does appear to be general influences and economic 
growth, the literature on the subject is complicated 
by lack of agreement on the nature of political 
development. Each approach to political development 
tends to produce its own distinct view of political 
development transformations typically accompanying 
urbanization and industrialization. 
The Almond model defines a modern political 
system as one in which "specialized structures 
(such as parties or bureaucracies) emerge having 
functionally distinct regulatory roles which they 
50 Rosen ligand, "Perceptions Regarding 
Business"..., p. 54. 
perform within the political system as a whole. This 
view of political development implies that "structural 
differentiation of the political system is the 
characteristic long-run concomitant of economic 
development.'1 
The establishment of an official policy making 
body within city government to handle the tasks of 
economic development planning and implementation was 
designed to facilitate "structural" improvements within 
city government and within the city as a whole. The 
creation of the Citizens Advisory Task Force supports 
this notion also. 
Another approach to political change defines 
political development as "an increase in government 
efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources 
of the policy for its goals." According to this 
approach, the key political transformations accompany¬ 
ing successive states in economic development relate 
to the role and efficiency of government. 
The basic social and economic changes 
characteristic of the early stages of 
economic growth, such as the decline 
of the traditional social system, tend 
to produce a systematic shift in the 
primary function of government.52 
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Colemen, The 
Politics of Developing Areas^ Princeton, N. J. 
(Princeton University Press, I960) pp. 56-81. 
52 ibid. 
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The point the author wishes to stress is that the 
above underline the importance of both increased 
government efficiency and effective integration in 
the process of sound economic development. 
Therefore, the dominant impediments to economic 
development in New Orleans, according to the model 
constructed exists within and among three key political 
characteristics to be observed: nature of the party 
system, role and efficiency of the governing body, and 
degree of political leadership to economic aspects. 
However effective integration relates to the 
socio-cultural aspects of the system and the political- 
economic aspects. 
Summarizing from the New Orleans model, the follow¬ 
ing represent the elemental impediments to the efficient 
integrative process (as derived from the models used 
when compared with the New Orleans model): 
- heterogeneous society 
- parochial attachments 
- lack of targeted skills training 
- shortage of skilled workers 
- high illiteracy 
- conservative backing 
- low level productivity 
- absence of. dynamic middled ass 
k7 
- one party state 
- lack of solid industrialization 
Initially, the greater the cultural and ethnic 
heterogeneity of a society, the less likely it is that 
integrative mechanisms are effective in promoting a 
sense of unity so needed in a strong modernization of 
outlook campaign. New Orleans society consists of a 
distinct cultural heterogeneity—a unique mixture of 
white Anglo-Saxon, Protestants, Catholics, Afro- 
Americans, creoles—or those whose ancestry consists 
of mixed marriages between and among Blacks, whites, 
and French people; a resettlement of Vietnamese, Cubans, 
Haitians, Hondurans, Mexicans, to name a few. This 
latter group is representative of the population of the 
city of New Orleans,According to the 1980 Census 
figures, which are currently being contested by the city 
in a suit against the labor department, "blacks comprise 
60% of the population of the Metropolitan area," (This 
study does not attempt to utilize the 1980 Census 
figures extensively because of the dispute,) 
The New Orleans model further reflected strong, 
exclusionary practices, especially within the ranks of 
social integration. The * carnival society* attitude 
governs every social and cultural dominant pattern of 
activity, historically. At low levels of development, 
U.S. Department of Labor, "Unemployment 
Characteristics and SMSA," Bureau of Census, 1980, 
kô 
the persistence of parochial, particularist attachments, 
along with the absence of a strong indigenous middle 
class and a presence of a traditional elite, strong 
centralized governments are rendered weak and ineffect¬ 
ive in promoting economic development plans. A 
preponderence of the above characteristics serve to 
impede progress, even within the structural framework 
of a ’committed political leadership’. 
The emergence of a political leadership committed 
to economic modernization is generally agreed to be 
essential to the socio-economic transformation that 
a traditional society must undergo for an effective 
take-off into self-sustained growth. 
At very low levels of development, the break¬ 
up of the social and political control 
exercised by traditional land-owning elites 
or other tradition-oriented bureaucratic 
or religious elites is important for the 
initiation of economic growth... 
Power is wielded by a religious segment in the city- 
Catholics* The Catholic church maintains and controls 
one dominant area which significantly impacts modern 
integrative effectiveness—communications media.. The 
Church owns and controls, via Loyola University, a 
Catholic University, two television networks—and three 
radio stations, excluding its campus communications. 
^ Everett Hagan, ”A Framework for Analyzing Change" 
in Development of the Emgi^ng Countries: An Agenda for 
Research. (Brookings, Institute, 1962) pT 90. 
k9 
The author suggests that there are two interrelated 
reasons why a breakup of traditional society is important 
at the onset of economic development planning: 
Control of the wealth of a country or area 
by a traditional elite tends to result in 
spending by wealth-owners for services, 
luxury goods, land and other real estate, 
rather than for the expansion of business 
enterprise; and tradition-oriented actions 
and ideologies tend to be dominated by 
ascriptive particularistic norms that often 
conflict with the requirements for economic 
modernization and technological change.5o 
Between the period 1978-1981» "there was an 
increase in the growth of personal income by the 2P/a of 
the population, owning and controlling the largest 
percentage of the wealth in dollars and other valuable 
57 tangibles, i.e. stock, gold, savings" in New Orleans. 
At the same time, however, all official figures from 
the office of the Mayor on the level of industrial 
growth, especially manufacturing and on business 
expansion, reflect a decline. Therefore, one may safely 
conclude that the increased personal wealth of the 
elites was spent on other than development projects. 
The inclination is for small clusters to remain 
attached to their own cluster groups, while retaining 
pre-judgment upon those outside of that group, without 
^ Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic 
» (Free Press, 1957) p. 111. 
New Orleans Economic Development Strategy. 
P. 4-5. 
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ever venturing beyond stipulated boundaries of interac¬ 
tion. This pattern of dualism is very relevant to an 
analysis of economic development within the New Orleans 
model. 
As such, the primary role for the administration 
become how best to break up these traditional enclaves, 
provide an atmosphere of homogeneity sufficient to 
establish a sense of unity and initiate a modernistic 
approach. The effectiveness and efficiency with which 
the roles are adapted represent an objective measure 
of the commitment to economic development in this case 
study. At this point a minus 1 indicator is assigned 
the model because of the presence of the above dualistic 
trend. 
The role of the administration, in breaking up the 
traditional enclaves and providing a sense of unity 
among the people, would, of necessity, express in the 
performance of concrete functions such as: ■ strengthening 
public service facilities (overhead capital), establish¬ 
ing a mechanism for citizen participation in government, 
and providing the impetus, publicity and drive for the 
promotion of development strategies within a context of 
political legitimacy. (The assessment of the 
administration’s strategy and accomplishments is discussed 
in Chapter IV.) 
Recapitulating, New Orleans in 1978 represented a 
low level of economic development according to the 
constructed model. "At the lowest level, social forces 
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were typically the most important non-economic influences 
upon economic development activity."58 Political change 
exercised a negligible impact. 
In the intermediate level, the market economy 
has preceeded relatively far, bub economic 
growth is still seriously impeded by the 
uneven pace of social development. At the 
highest level, socio-structural bottlenecks 
no longer reflect as significant barriers 
to economic progress, and measures are aimed 
at promoting development.59 
Furthermore, the New Orleans model exhibited key 
impediments to economic progress according to the 
constructed model of a highly, competitive and developed 
society. The city government functions within an 
essential non-competitive political climatej where 
strong traditional elistist attitudes and cultural 
heterogeneity predominate. 
58 Everett Hagan,. "A Framework for Analysing Change" 
in Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for 
Research. Brookings Institute 19^2 
59 Ibid. 
Chapter IV 
Summary of the’Economic Development Strategy 
This chapter draws heavily from the Morial 
Economic Directive, Economic Development Strategy (EDS). 
The establishment and maintenance of an economic 
development office was the first priority accomplishment 
of the Morial Administration regarding development 
strategies. 
The need for such an office was an obvious one for 
the precise and detailed articulation of a clearly 
defined political strategy for economic development. 
The office was created to plan and implement a strategy 
which, when realized would catupult the city into a 
highly competitive, industrialized city with internation¬ 
al standing along conventional economic indexes. In 
addition New Orleans would possess a unique social, 
political and economic infrastructure, improved in 
every category or index listed in this thesis. 
Briefly speaking the major objectives of the 
program strategy are: "(1) to reverse the decline of 
commercially vital areas (neighborhoods), to increase 
the number of job opportunities for the citizens, to 
increase the city's tax base; (2) to generate private 
investment in businesses, to encourage and sponsor 
business assistance and relocation packages sufficient 
to stimulate new growth; (3) to expand tourist and 
port-related financial activities, to plan and develop 
industrial parks, and to increase the amount of foreign 
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and domestic trade and commerce passing through the 
Port of New Orleans,"^0 
Once the office of economic development has been 
established the administration tackled one of "New 
Orleans’ most critical problems: insufficient number 
of qualified employment candidates—to meet the 
current or anticipated work force demands of private 
industry. Currently it is estimated that the New 
Orleans based unmet annual demand for trained workers 
is 8,500^1 and rising. Even assuming that major 
improvements in the number and quality of graduates 
will be made at every existing level of basic and 
vocational-technical education during the next three 
years, it is clearly not realistic to expect that the 
City, given its current fiscal condition, could commit 
substantial local revenues to labor force training 
programs. Therefore, the strategy calls for the 
formulation of "employer-oriented skills training 
programs which stress on-the-job training or stimula¬ 
tion training techniques," The design of this element 
of the strategy is to place candidates with employers 
who have experienced "chronic labor supply needs", 
and within the neighborhoods, themselves. This would 
Mid-term Mayor’s Penort. Office of Public 
Information, May 1978, p.72 
61 - ~ U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment 
Characteristics and SMSA. Bureau of the Census. City 
of New Orleans, 1970, 1980. 
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further insure that a permanent link is established 
between the community organizations, which would con¬ 
duct the training programs and business community. 
Training facilities would eventually become the 
property of the organizations through lease 
assignments. 
At this time, "two community organization- 
employer training programs have been evaluated” —one 
involved a major shipbuilding firm and the Desire 
community Housing Corporation. This program has not 
been implemented to date. The shipbuilding firm is 
committed., but the residents and members of the Desire 
Corporation have not yet consented to the terms cf the 
program implementation. 
Another major element of the New Orleans Economic 
Development stratety is the "community action project 
strategy". In brief, these projects are defined as 
"those economic development activities undertaken 
through the cooperative efforts of the City of New 
Orleans and a representative community organization 
to increase opportunities in or near low income 
neighborhoods represented." This element of the 
strategy may be categorized as a function of or by¬ 
product of the administration* s goal of creating and 
maintaining a modernized outlook in the city. Specific 
reference to several projects undertaken under the 
auspices of the Community Action Project strategy will 
not be included here. As of the second year of the 
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Mayor* s first administration, no skills training 
programs had been implemented. One project was in 
the first phase of completion, scheduled for implemen¬ 
tation in 1981. 
In conjunction with the above strategy, an area 
skills training center has been established in one of 
the city's public housing projects. An estimated 
$650,000 has been obtained from the federal Economic 
Development Administration under the Carter 
administration, to initiate and facilitate increased 
employment opportunities. An additional $2,000,000 
is needed in order to create a neighborhood convenience 
shopping area/skills training center. Financial 
assistance for the firms which will sublease space in 
the complex will be provided through the city's 
business assistance programs. When completed the 
projected annual output of the center will be between 
300 and 500 trainees, with an estimated direct annual 
placement of a minimum of 200 trainees in full-time 
jobs at a minimum of $6.00 per hour. 
The second major component of the economic 
development strategy revolves around the goal of 
increased industrialization of the city's economy. 
Projects being evaluated and implemented in this 
category are designed to: underline diversification 
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of the economy, insure the close proximity between 
the goods-consuming population and the goods-producing 
population and enhance trade and comrade via the Port 
of New Orleans, 
In conjunction with the above goals, the city has 
developed and is currently leasing industrial park 
sites in the Almonaster-Eastern New Orleans 
Industrial Area Corridor, This park site represents 
the only immediate opportunity for the city of New 
Orleans to measurably increase its industrial 
employment and property tax base. Furthermore, it 
offers the first and only developed industrial site 
for business relocation packaging which includes 
significant locational advantages, i,e. the inter¬ 
state highway and rail access, deep water shipping, 
and close proximity to the city's labor pool. However, 
these lands are seriously deficient with respect to 
drainage, elevation, sewer and water services, and 
just about every other characteristic that could be 
considered minimal standard for modern industrial 
sites, especially, for immediate occupancy. 
Additional constraints on these lands*-involve contin¬ 
uing debate about negative wetland environment impacts. 
At this time a long-range Almonaster-Sast New 
Orleans Land Use Plan covering infrastructure, eleva¬ 
tion, rail drainage, and all basic site development 
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support facilities is being undertaken. This plan will 
be the basis for all future developments, whether 
public or privately sponsored. 
New Orleans faces a severe shortage of ’improved’ 
industrial park sites within its corporate limits, 
despite the fact that thousands of acres of adequately 
zoned vacant land exist. Aggressive industrial 
corporation interest in locating in Orleans Parish 
is evidenced by the level of inquiries made to local 
Economic Development agencies. The New Orleans 
Public Service Incorporated (NOPSI)’s industrial and 
area development division has indicated that in 1978, 
their office received approximately 30 serious requests 
by major manufacturing firms seeking immediate location 
in Orleans Parish. 
Of these thirty firms, twenty-two have already 
selected sites outside of Orleans Parish—pre¬ 
dominantly in Jefferson Parish, Lake Charles, 
Lafayette, Shreveport or Mississippi. 
An example of the industries seeking sites in 
Orleans shows: Steel fabrication, rail car manufactur¬ 
ing and assembly, recreational vehicle manufacturing 
and assembly, offshore steel supplies manufacturing, 
electronics assembly, and foundry. 
Additionally, the city’s employment base and 
industrial base are enhanced by the riverfront area. 
58 
This area currently holds over 10% of all manufacturing 
employment in the city. 
These firms are threatened hy a combination 
of rapidly inflating land values, congested 
conditions,.lack of expansion space. 
Permanent job losses from firms in the path of the 
proposed bridge are projected at roughly 1,500, while 
the overall loss of manufacturing employment to the 
city of New Orleans from the Riverfront Industrial 
Area as a result of the combined impacts of Bridge 
relocation and rapidly changing land use patterns, is 
thought to be much higher than the figure quoted above. 
In order to offset the impact for heavy industrial 
loss at a time of stepped up ’internal industrial 
increase', The city of New Orleans has embarked on 
two ambitious and potentially productive development 
plans of the city's history. In an effort to 
encourage tourist and port related trade and commerce, 
MEGALINK was developed. 
Megalink comprises a series of projects 
within the Central Business District, 
which will improve the physical health 
of New Orleans and provide a large boost 
to the city's port-and tourist based economy. 
The purpose of Megalink will be to provide ease, 
access and convenience, with regard to climate, 
transportation and residential use—to the vital. 
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areas of the city via the linking of Central Business 
District, French Quarters, major modal transportation 
center, the riverfront district and Lafayette Square 
under an enclosed mall superstructure of dome. The 
projects are in varying phases of completion at the 
writing of this paper, and most of time for completion 
for the World’s Fair in 1984- Phase I projects are: 
Canal Place—a multi-use development at the foot of 
Canal Street, which involves a highfashion, internation¬ 
al center of banking and commerce, along with a major 
office complex. Private commitment in the project 
currently totals $123,000,000, with an additional 
$5,000,000 being sought; restoration and revitalization 
of the Grand Hotel, Minicipal Auditorium and Lafayette 
Mall—projects totaling $7,000,000, of which $4,000,000 
have been obtained; and the completion of a new exhibi¬ 
tion hall--a facility with 250,000 square feet of 
exhibit space. The city recently imposed a one-cent 
hotel-motel tax which is expected to generate $25 million 
in additional revenue. Project completion date is set 
for 1983. The exhibition hall is a phase II project. 
Phase III includes: a multimodal transportation 
center, which will coordinate airport, inter-city and 
intra-city buses, as well as rail or other transportation 
technologies implemented in the future, and Union Mall, 
which would link the Civic Center area with the 
riverfront. 
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Megalink recognizes and exploits the subtle inter¬ 
dependencies between all these projects and the service 
and business needs they fulfill. It is the framework 
within which the Central Business District of New 
Orleans can be re-born, re-built, and revitalized. 
These represent successful planning and a degree 
of successful implementation of major projects, all 
initiated by the Morial Administration's office of 
Economic Development. Though they only begin to 
scratch the surface of overcoming dualistic tendencies, 
which impact development in fundamental ways, they 
represent and demonstrate a commitment to economic 
development on the part of city government, and 
connote positive indication of growth, and progress, 
further evidenced by formal planning. 
As stated throughout this thesis, the dominant 
negative indicator which has impeded economic progress 
has been the absence of a solid industrial base. In 
assessing the strategy being implemented by the city of 
New Orleans, this single fact is responsible for the 
low level of development in which the city finds 
itself at this time. 
Many of the projects discussed in this chapter 
are still on the drawing board, due in part to the 
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projected abolition of the EDA in Washington ; 
Administration received an estimated 67 million for 
area development. Part of the solution to developing 
an industrial base called for the establishment of an 
effective business assistance and relocation-incentive 
package to be sold to firms with expressed interest 
in expansion into the New Orleans area. The 
\ 
facility is designed to ’ alert the staff to companies 
with express expansion needs, facility deficiencies 
and decision-making monitoring devices* useful in 
soliciting relocation. 
One documented case of relocation assistance 
packaging as described above has been handled by the 
city to date. The city provided a loan package of 
$600,000 to a Chinese Industrial cleaning manufac¬ 
turing company, employing approximately 100 new 
workers from Orl.eans Parish. 
In trade and port related activities, more positive 
economic growth is indicated. Two trade missions were 
appointed, one of which went to Africa, but with no 
documentable commercial impact in the form of export- 
import business and one of which went to France in 
1978. 
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Based upon that mission, two French companies have 
initiated plans to move to New Orleans. 
They include a $300 million petrochemical com¬ 
plex providing 3500 permanent construction 
jobs and a medical equipment manufactuter. 
However, the stimulation to the Port of New 
Orleans remains negligible. In 1979, the city made 
an effort to re-stimulate an old trade, the banana 
market, to return to the Port, and was successful in 
its efforts. An additional 126 new longshoreman 
jobs were created, as a result of these efforts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Economic Progress as is defined by the models 
of underdevelopment discussed in this thesis include 
all of the following which were appropriate to New 
Orleans in 1973 when Ernest Dutch Morial took office 
as the first Black mayor and in 1980 as the mid-term 
phase of his first administration. 
Briefly, the Almond and Coleman.model defined 
economic progress in terms of a relationship between 
how the so'ciety has evolved politically and how the 
society has evolved economically measured by 
urbanization, commercialization, dynamic middle- 
class in governing the process of change, literacy 
rate and other factors as enumerated in Chapter I of 
this thesis. Under this analysis a society would be 
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at a low level of economic development when a relative¬ 
ly large input has been -made into the production 
process, however, a small output has resulted and low 
standards of living are apparent. 
The Morial Administration has invested $360 
million in promoting and developing an economic 
strategy of New Orleans. This thesis has. shown 
that with the large monetary investment there has been 
a small, but significant economic change resulting. 
Two of the major programs of the Economic Develop¬ 
ment Strategy are Megalink and Almonaster Eastern New 
Orleans Industrial Site and are in phase II of three 
phased timetable for completion. These programs have 
been halted because of the elimination of Economic 
Development Administration by Ronald Reagan. 
The continued financing and economic development of 
these projects is vital. However, at this time New 
Orleans has no resources with which to complete these 
projects. 
This also re-inforces the economic model from 
Hollis Scheme where the emphasis is on the authorita¬ 
tive attention given the economic condition of New 
Orleans by Mayor Morial has been revealed in an 
actual dollar figure of 360 million. Since there 
have not been sizable awards made in the fields of 
education, or health - this reflects a persistent 
imbalance between the supply of human capital and 
labor 
64 
Hagan does emphasize class!fying an area as non¬ 
competitive, competitive or semi-competitive level of 
functioning, based on its political machinery. 
In 1978 when Dutch Morial took office, this 
author can conclude that New Orleans would have been 
classified as having a political superstructure that 
was essentially non-competitive. This is based on 
the theory that New Orleans is a city within a state 
Louisiana, which has been primarily one party, Democra¬ 
tic, since Reconstruction up to the election in 1980 
of Dave Treen, a Republican governor, two years after 
Morial's election. 
Although city elections are non-partisan there 
is little secret as to the party affiliation of Dutch 
in 1978 and that was Democratic. There is no secret 
that councilmanic membership is also primarily demo¬ 
cratic. This distinction is significant in this 
paper because it points up the fact that under a 
non-competitive classification, one finds the interests 
of the competitive section is being fulfilled by those 
of the traditional political hierachy which existed 
since Reconstruction. This is not a democratic 
expression of the desires of all and therefore 
political integration and participation - which is 
so important in the Almond and Coleman Scheme, is 
threatened. 
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Various non-economic forces were also at work which 
had been at work since Louisiana Purchase that Sadie 
hypothesizes serves as a useful approximation of 
identification of the stage of economic development 
within the society at a particular time. I conclude 
from the data that in 1978 and prior, no doubt, New 
Orleans could be classified as functioning at the 
lowest stage of socio-economic development. The 
economic activity—the means of the generation of 
capital resources and utilization of this capital was 
clothed in conventional social values of traditional 
elites. Further, this aspect, solely from Sadie's 
model, serves to most accurately describe the 
dominant level in social and political development 
in the city up until 1978 when Dutch took office. 
The conventional elites and the overriding trend is 
one of a carnival social system. Within this 
hierachy there are strictly social organizations 
which decide, define and determine social mobility, 
and political, religious and economic mobility in 
New Orleans. 
At the lowest level at which I suggest New 
Orleans was classified in 1978, social forces are the 
single most important non-economic influence upon 
economic development which directly impacts political- 
economic change. 
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Blacks are a more vital part of business and 
commerce than they were in 1978, There is more 
movement between the races, where it had not 
heretofore occurred. Voting population has increased 
5% overall among blacks and international clientele 
has surfaced. In 1984» the city is hostessing 
the World’s Fair and in general, there is more of a 
vision and hope for a more equitable allocation of 
resources. 
This is not to say that statistically the evalu¬ 
ation and plan have shown tremendous growth and 
progress in terms of the budget or capital resources. 
It does show a marked increase in the level of 
optimism that New Orleans is definitely in a transi¬ 
tion stage. It has moved from the lowest stage to 
an intermediate stage. Greater progress is on the 
horizon. 
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